Is George Bush Legally Qualified To Give Orders On Nuclear Weapons?
1) The United States Defense Department lays down regulations to ensure the highest standards of individual reliability in armed forces personnel who have duties associated with nuclear weapons. They are contained in the DoD Directive on “Nuclear Weapon Personnel Reliability Program” (PRP): the most recent, Title DODD 5210.42, was issued on May 25, 1993.
2) Several of its provisions would appear to disqualify George W Bush, President and Commander-In-Chief.
3) The Directive (section A3) requires the selection and retention for nuclear-weapons duties “of only those personnel who are emotionally stable, physically capable, and who have demonstrated reliability and professional competence”. In his own words, George W Bush was “young and irresponsible”, but his youth and irresponsibility lasted until he was 40 years old, a period of his life marked by drinking and widely-alleged cocaine abuse, unstable behavior, family quarrels, business failures and a general lack of focus in his life. Moreover, Bush’s record in the National Air Guard was thoroughly unreliable, with unexplained absences, incomplete service and failure to take a medical test, which made him unable to perform his duty as a trained pilot. This is not the profile of a man who would meet the criteria of section A3.
4) The Directive lays down two categories of armed forces personnel with nuclear duties: Critical and Controlled. The former are subject to more regular and stringent tests. Bush is in the Critical category: “can either directly or indirectly cause the launch or use of a nuclear weapon” (Definitions: 11 b).
5) The Directive provides that the PRP shall be accomplished by the “initial and continual evaluation of individuals assigned to PRP duties. The management of the PRP is a function of command. However, each person assigned to PRP duties has an obligation to report any behavior or circumstance about themselves or others in the PRP that may or could be expected to result in a degradation in job performance or personal reliability or an unsafe or insecure condition involving nuclear weapons.” (Procedures A 1). If Bush himself has concealed any circumstance, past or present, which is relevant to his evaluation this should normally result in automatic disqualification from nuclear weapons duty.
6) Under Procedures B Reliability Standards, paragraph B 1 c Medical Evaluation states that “all potentially disqualifying medical information must be documented in the individual’s health records”. Again any concealment of relevant information, past or present, should result in automatic disqualification. There are numerous question marks over Bush’s past medical history, and a particular gap over his service in the Air National Guard.
7) Under the Reliability Standards both alcohol and drug abuse are grounds for disqualification from nuclear duties. (B 2 (1) and (2)).
8) Bush was a heavy drinker until he was 40 and involved in several alcohol-related incidents, including some while he was still under military discipline in the National Air Guard. During that period he would have been disqualified from nuclear duties. An officer disqualified as an alcohol abuser may return to nuclear duties only after successfully completing “a minimum 180-day rehabilitation program, or treatment regimen, prescribed by the competent medical authority” (B 2 a (1) (b)). Bush did give up drinking but by his own will and not through a formal, medically prescribed program or treatment regimen. This would not have lifted his disqualification. Moreover, involvement in another alcohol incident would result in permanent disqualification.
9) If Bush ever used cocaine (a matter on which he has always been evasive) he would be permanently ineligible for nuclear duties – whether he disclosed the use or not (B 2 a (2) (b)). His disqualification would be a matter of permanent record.
10) Given his record in the National Air Guard Bush also might be disqualified on grounds of Negligence or Delinquency in Performance of Duty (B 2 b).
11) Bush might advance the “young and irresponsible” defence. However, the Directive makes it clear that this defence is not absolute and that some youthful indiscretions are regarded as permanent. For example, there is no waiver for youthful use of cocaine, only for cannabis and then only if it has been disclosed by the subject, and if it happened before he or she entered military service. Moreover, there is no “youthful indiscretion” defence for failure to take a required medical test (as Bush did in 1972 when still in the Air National Guard).
12) Finally, there is a clear presumption throughout the Directive that anything unexplained in the subject’s record should disqualify him or her from nuclear duties. There is a long list of unexplaineds in the life of George W Bush.
Conclusion
If Bush were a regular member of the armed forces, rather than their commander-in-chief, it is almost certain that he would be disqualified from nuclear duties.